Is there any way to introduce a thesis without sounding like a pompous pratt?

“Consciousness: The having of perceptions, thought, and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of confusing consciousness with self consciousness - to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it.” (Sutherland 1989 in Chalmers 1996)

I would like to add, in a small way, to the body of literature not worth reading. Specifically I would like to present my thoughts on the “epi” in “epiphenomenal qualia”, both why it is there, and why I think there are reasons to eliminate it. I do not propose to replace epiphenomenal qualia with an alternative theorem, only to propose that epiphenomenal qualia, if viewed from the perspective of biological function, appear to be absurd. I would like to throw a spanner in the epiphenomonological works, as it were, and if not convince, at least give reason to pause for thought.

Epiphenomenalism states that phenomenological qualia do not have a back and forth relation between the brain and mind. In other words, that for phenomenological qualia, the relation is one way. According to some, qualia are an evolutionary accident, like the heaviness of a polar bear’s coat (Jackson ref).

I would like to argue that epiphenomenal qualia are not evolutionary baggage, nor are they one way and that they play an indispensable role in our lives. In order to do so, I examine Campbell's exegesis of the Mind Body Problem and his arrival at ephiphenomenal qualia as a viable solution for materialists. I note his rather blithe acceptance of mind as spirit, and that he narrows the definition of qualia to encompass only those that have problematic mystique, conveniently excluding qualia that might be involved in action. I also outline some problems I have with the notion that phenomenal qualia are one way, particularly the idea that epiphenomenal qualia are one way, yet somehow we know about them. I then argue that for pain and pleasure qualia, the one way notion is absurd, particularly within the context of evolutionary survival. Finally, I introduce the idea that the clinical condition of pain asymbolia provides an example where pain qualia exist without function. Dismissing the notion that pain qualia supervene on pain function as suggested by Chalmers.....

GOD, I am a total wanker.